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Social Media Analysis and Public Opinion: The 2010 UK General Election  
Abstract 
Social media monitoring in politics can be understood by situating it in theories of public 
opinion. The multi-method study we present here indicates how social media monitoring 
allow for analysis of social dynamics through which opinions form and shift. Analysis of 
media coverage from the 2010 UK General Election demonstrates that social media are now 
being equated with public opinion by political journalists. Building on this, we use interviews 
with pollsters, social media researchers and journalists to examine the perceived link between 
social media and public opinion. In light of competing understandings these interviews 
reveal, we argue for a broadening of the definition of public opinion to include its social 
dimension. 
Keywords: Elections, Grounded Theory, Public Opinion, Social Media, Twitter, United 
Kingdom.   
Social Media Analysis and Public Opinion: The UK General Election 2010 
Introduction 
Recent years have seen a great deal of academic interest in the possibility of using social 
media to measure public opinion. Broadly this research has looked to achieve two goals. 
First, scholars have attempted to use social media data to predict election results (Franch, 
2013; Jensen & Anstead, 2013; O'Connor, Balasubramanyan, Routledge, & Smith, 2010; 
Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, & Welpe, 2010; Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, & Welpe, 
2011). A second strand of research has attempted to measure the public’s evolving response 
to stimuli, examining both short term events such as televised political debates (Elmer, 2013; 
Shamma, Kennedy, & Churchill, 2009) and long term events such as economic downturns 
(Gonzalez-Bailon, Banchs, & Kaltenbrunner, 2010).  
Such studies have been criticised for a number of reasons. It has been argued that social 
media research of public opinion involves arbitrary methodological decisions, such as which 
political parties to include in the study (Jungherr, Jürgens, & Schoen, 2012). This problem is 
made more acute, critics argue, because research is often only conducted after the event 
studied. As a result, various methods can be tested until one appears to work. However, this 
greatly limits the general applicability of any “successful” approach (Gayo-Avello, 2011). 
Additionally, it has also been noted that the user-base of social media is not representative of 
the voting population and, as yet, no methods exist to correct this (Gayo-Avello, 2013; P. T. 
Metaxas, E. Mustafaraj, & D. Gayo-Avello, 2011).  
While these debates have been useful and vigorous, they have almost exclusively focused on 
questions of method. This article seeks to correct that oversight, and address the relationship 
between social media and public opinion through the prism of public opinion theory. In 
particular, while there are clearly shortcomings in social media-based public opinion research 
(especially due to the non-representative user-base), the extent to which these are viewed as 
insurmountable problems largely depends on the definition of public opinion being 
employed.    
 
It has long been noted that public opinion is a very slippery concept to define. As a result of 
this, there are numerous definitions of public opinion in circulation (Childs, 1939; 
Stromback, 2012). The orthodox contemporary view of public opinion, most clearly 
expressed by early pollsters such as George Gallup (1939) and Floyd Henry Allport (1937), is 
that it is nothing more than the cumulative preferences of individual citizens. With this view, 
public opinion is seen as something that exists and which pollsters aim to discover. More 
critical definitions have argued against this position, claiming that public opinion research 
manufactures public opinion rather than simply discovering it (Bourdieu, 1979). Despite 
these critical voices, there can be no doubt that the Gallupian paradigm of public opinion has 
continued dominate the journalistic, political and general imagination (Herbst, 1993; Moon, 
1999).  
A different way to understand public opinion is to approach the concept as multi-faceted and 
historically contingent. While opinion polling is central to the contemporary definition of 
public opinion, to suggest that this understanding is permanent would be decidedly ahistorical 
and neglect a number of earlier definitions and debates surrounding public opinion reaching 
back to the nineteenth century (Splichal, 2012). Susan Herbst, for example, uses the term 
public opinion infrastructure to describe these distinctive eras of public opinion definition 
and measurement (Herbst, 2001). The contemporary era of public opinion research is, in this 
view, seen as the product of a specific infrastructure of opinion polling methods, mass media 
and modernity.  
It follows that new methods used in public opinion research, such as social media analysis, 
necessitate a reinterpretation of public opinion. Using the 2010 UK General Election as a 
case study, this article employs a three-stage grounded theory approach to better understand 
social media-based public opinion research and to offer such a reinterpretation of public 
opinion. The first stage of this process is a qualitative analysis of media coverage referencing 
social media during the 2010 election. This analysis suggests that social media was employed 
in a number of ways to reflect public opinion. Most interestingly, we find references to large-
scale semantic analysis of social media data in media coverage (a process we refer to as 
“semantic polling”). Building on this, the second stage of the research explores this 
phenomenon further by drawing on interviews with experts in social media and public 
opinion research. These allow us to explore how different types of researchers conceive the 
idea of public opinion and the tensions that exist between their conceptions.  
Finally, we draw on this dataset to rethink the idea of public opinion. We argue that semantic 
polling requires a broader definition of public opinion than found in the dominant opinion 
polling paradigm.. In order to construct such a definition, we argue that there is value in 
looking to older theories, going back to the nineteenth century political theorist James Bryce 
and the mid-twentieth century sociologist Herbert Blumer. Their theories differ from the 
dominant contemporary public opinion paradigm, and are much better able to take account of 
the nature of social media, which can be understood as an “organ of public opinion” (Bryce, 
1888). Understood through this definition, social media public opinion research may not offer 
a representation of the entire public but it has other virtues. It enables studies that focus on 
social interaction and conversation rather than simple preferences, and introduces a strongly 
temporal dimension to public opinion research. Ultimately, if accepted, this conception leaves 
open the possibility of social media-based methods co-existing with more traditional polling-
based techniques, rather than being seen as inferior or bogus. 
Motivations, methods and key research objectives 
Our interest in social media and public opinion started when [Author 2] was invited to work 
with a firm carrying out an exploratory study of public responses to the 2010 Prime 
Ministerial debates on Twitter as part of a larger government funded research project on 
social media monitoring.
i
 To further our understanding of this relationship, we employed a 
number of methods between April 2010 and June 2012. This involved both a qualitative 
thematic analysis of media coverage during the 2010 election, and interviews and workshops 
with experts in the field.  
The purpose of the media analysis was to assess how social media data were being used to 
inform discussion of public opinion in political coverage. In order to examine this, we 
constructed a dataset of media coverage referencing Twitter during the course of the statutory 
campaign period of 6
th
 April – 6th May 2010. While Twitter is clearly not synonymous with 
social media, at this moment in time it provokes the greatest interest as a possible tool for 
measuring public opinion both in academia and the corporate sector. There are two reasons 
for this. First, the micro-blog format (for which Twitter is the de-facto standard) lends itself 
to gathering large datasets in real-time as major events occur. Additionally, the relative 
openness of Twitter, with the vast majority of posts being publicly available, means data are 
readily accessible (Gayo-Avello, 2013: 650).  
Our search for Twitter-related news content generated 287 items: 
 Newspaper articles referencing both Twitter and the general election. This element of 
the dataset was gathered by using a Lexis Nexis search applied to all national British 
newspapers (n=227).
ii
 
 A television sample, made up of episodes of BBC Newsnight and the ITN Evening 
News from the statutory campaign period (n=41). 
 Additional documents available online relevant to this research, including articles and 
blog entries published by mainstream media websites, as well as press releases and 
documents issued by social media analysis firms. These were gathered by monitoring 
published media and the outputs of social media monitoring firms. These data adds 
additional insights that are sometimes not found in other media discussions (n=19).  
While these data could have been examined using a quantitative media content analysis 
approach, we opted for a thematic analysis. The reason for this, as earlier research on public 
opinion has noted (Bauman & Herbst, 1994: 135), is that the amorphous nature of the subject 
makes formal coding very disparate and thus unsuitable for exploratory research of the kind 
being done here. In contrast thematic analysis is a powerful tool for theory building from 
empirical data (for an overview of the thematic analysis method see Boyatzis, 1998 and 
Guest et al, 2011).      
We also conducted a set of elite semi-structured interviews, carried out by research assistants 
working on the project.
iii
 The sample of twenty interviewees was guided in the first instance 
by our thematic media analysis and then used a snowball technique to broaden the sample. 
The interviewees fell into five (on occasions overlapping) cohorts: data analysts, who worked 
for the firms that were actually mining and analysing social media data; the journalists who 
were reporting these findings; politicians and political consultants; pollsters, who were 
experts in using more traditional means of measuring public opinion; and electoral regulators, 
with a responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the electoral process. The sample was 
chosen with the aim of obtaining a rounded view of the problems and potentials of social 
media analysis. In order to ensure they could talk candidly, interviewees were assured that 
they would not be identified (an anonymous list of interviewees is included as appendix 
one).
iv
 Finally, we convened two workshops in a major city in Europe to discuss this 
phenomenon which bought together representatives of analytics firms, pollsters, news editors 
and non-government organizations, giving them a space to allow them to debate conceptual, 
practical and ethical challenges raised by social media analysis. 
This mixed-method approach yielded a rich corpus for the analysis of conceptual and 
normative understandings of public opinion held by members of “the industry” and how 
traditional pollsters and journalists felt their roles were challenged by new technologies and 
analytical methods. This allowed us to deploy a heuristic analysis consistent with the precepts 
of grounded theory to analyse key themes in the dataset (Glaser & Strauss, 1968; Urquhart, 
2013), to reflect on theory and to suggest theoretical development relating to social media 
analysis and public opinion.  
Twitter and news media presentation of public opinion in 2010 
How did journalists connect social media and public opinion during the campaign? Our 
thematic analysis of the 227 newspaper articles as well as 41 television news broadcasts from 
the 2010 UK election period suggests that references to Twitter were ever-present in the four 
week campaign. The vast majority of this coverage focused on a few topics, notably 
politicians who were embarrassed by ill-advised Tweets or Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s 
wife Sarah Brown who had a million followers on the micro-blogging site. However, our 
combined dataset of newspaper articles, television broadcasts and other election texts 
produced by media organisations and research firms contains 47 attempts to employ social 
media (in a number of ways, discussed below) as evidence of public opinion during the 
campaign.
v
  
Previous research has found that public opinion is presented in various ways in media 
coverage of politics (Lewis, 2001; Lewis, Wahl‐Jorgensen, & Inthorn, 2004). This variety of 
approaches continues when social media data are used. It was possible to identify three 
distinct ways in which social media was employed as evidence. Furthermore, the different 
types of data used reflected quite different characterizations of public opinion. These are 
shown in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
First, and in a manner noted in previous research examining the use of selected Tweets in 
mainstream American media (Wallsten, 2011), reporters selectively quoted individual users 
of social media to create anecdotal evidence of the public's reaction. Essentially, this is a 
form of electronic vox pop. This type of content therefore reflects the long-established 
journalistic practice of taking the opinions of individuals to reflect wider strands of opinion in 
society (Larson, 1999; Robinson, 2012: 10). Examples of this approach appeared in both 
national newspapers and broadcast television, notably in the aftermath of the televised 
debates. In the print media, following the first debate, a number of commentators quoted 
individual status updates to note that some members of the public were mocking the process 
and the three party leaders (Sawyer, 2010; Thorpe, 2010). BBC Newsnight, a “broadsheet”-
style current affairs magazine programme, ran segments in all three of its post-debate shows. 
Fronted by reporter Justin Rowlett and employing the website Twitterfall, these segments ran 
for up to ten minutes, drawing on social media data, including comments made on Twitter, 
Facebook and the BBC’s own web forums (Twitterfall, 2012). This information was 
deployed largely in an illustrative fashion to suggest the public’s reaction to the debates. 
However, the positioning within the programme of such reporting of anecdotal social media 
commentary was notable. While traditional opinion polls headlined the programme and were 
treated with reverence, social media data are normally discussed towards the end of the 
broadcast, alongside other, less established methods for gauging public response, such as “the 
worm” (a graphical display showing a focus group’s response to specific portions of the 
debate). This section of the programme was also frequently book-ended by lighter discussion 
of the debates, involving, for example, body language experts. Hence, this running order is 
indicative of the assumed sovereignty and greater significance of traditional polling. 
The second strand of reporting employing social media as evidence for public opinion was 
based on what we have termed raw quantitative statements. In practice, this took two forms. 
First, it meant citing the number of tweets or tweeters commenting on a specific topic or 
event. Interestingly, similar data could be interpreted in many different (sometimes 
diametrically opposing) ways. For example, on some occasions the numbers were quoted as 
evidence of positive engagement with the political process, especially among young people:  
 
[T]housands of people, and especially first-time voters, were watching them [the 
debates] on two screens: the TV screen and their mobile phone or computer, which 
they used to monitor and respond on Twitter and Facebook… in the third debate there 
were 154,342 tweets tagged "#leadersdebate", coming at 26.77 tweets a second, 
spread among 33,095 people. Though that surely doesn't include many hundreds - 
perhaps thousands - of others who didn't use the tag (Arthur, 2010). 
 
However, the very same data were also be used to suggest growing boredom and 
disengagement among the population with the election campaign: 
 
[Tweetminster] reporting this week that were 54,000 tweets, about 27 tweets a 
second.
vi
 Interestingly though, only about 33,000 actual twitterers. So, a small number 
of twitterers making a lot of tweets out there (Rowlett, 2010). 
 
A second raw quantitative use of social media data involved reference to so-called trending 
topics. A number of sites monitor popular topics of conversation, and the words and phrases 
appearing on Twitter in order to publish lists of those that are being discussed by lots of 
people. The fluctuation of trending topics, and particularly the rapid rise of hashtags (a short 
code inserted into a message to make it searchable), were widely reported during the election 
campaign. Some examples that achieved coverage were the result of party mobilisation, such 
as the Labour Party’s #welovethenhs (Hinsliff, 2010). However, by far the most commented 
on hashtag during the campaign was #NickCleggsFault, an ironic response to a battery of 
negative stories launched by Conservative supporting newspapers following the Liberal 
Democrat leader’s strong showing in the first debate, when: 
 
[A] Twitter campaign made a mockery of the crude smears. The "nickcleggsfault" tag 
became the most popular in Britain within hours. Thousands of fun messages blaming 
him for all the world's problems left the barely disguised Tory attack against the 
Liberal Democrat looking daft (Roberts, 2010).
vii
 
 
We found statements linking both the number of updates around events or trending topics on 
social media to share two characteristics. First, the data were used in a very crude form, often 
simply involving the citing of numbers. Second, the inferences that were drawn from these 
data tended to cast public opinion or a sub-set of public opinion as having a single, shared 
preference. This might be related to their level of engagement or apathy, or possibly indicate 
anger towards the political classes or the press, as in the #NickCleggsFault example. As such, 
this type of reporting is analogous to past coverage of electoral campaigns in the UK that 
might have referenced electoral turnout or incidences of political mobilization by groups with 
a shared viewpoint. 
The third use of social media data are what we term semantic polling. The semantic polling 
process has three elements. First, it involves the harvesting of large datasets from social 
media services online (in 2010, this meant datasets almost exclusively from Twitter). Second, 
those datasets are analysed using computer-based natural language processing techniques to 
attribute some kind of numeric indicator of sentiment to it, most often relating to the number 
of positive to negative comments about specific politicians, parties or policies. Finally, this 
information is put into a format, numerical or graphical, suitable for public dissemination.  
It could be argued that this method is not really akin to polling, at least as we traditionally 
understand it. After all, the sample is non-representative of the voting population (an issue 
discussed further below), while no citizens have actually had their opinions directly 
solicited.
viii
  However we would argue that the term polling is appropriate for two reasons. 
First, semantic polling presents public opinion as being heterogeneous, and aims to measure 
the differing attitudes and reactions that exist among citizens. Second, semantic polling can 
produce quantitative public opinion information that can be discussed and presented either 
numerically or graphically in a very similar manner to traditional opinion polls. As such – 
and while the methods of data collection might be very different – the outputs of semantic 
polling are of a similar genre to traditional opinion polls.   
 
A number of private firms specializing in these techniques appeared in election-time media 
coverage, which featured data produced by Lexalyticals, Linguamatics, Meltwater Buzz, 
Semiocast and Tweetminster. The findings of these firms were reported by the BBC’s 
technology correspondent Rory Cellan-Jones on his blog on the BBC website, dot.Rory 
(Cellan-Jones, 2010b). The magazine PR Week commissioned a weekly online sentiment 
tracker (Sudhaman, 2010). Many of the social media consultancies also published their own 
blogs and press releases.  
This media analysis reveals competing understandings of public opinion and the ways 
journalists report on social media in order to make claims about it. In the next section we turn 
to interviews conducted with various sections of “the industry” and find such differences are 
grounded both in the value attributed to different methodologies and broader differences of 
goals and interests. This analysis provides a foundation for our attempt to re-theorise public 
opinion in a way that explains how both traditional and sematic polling can complement each 
other to provide have a more holistic and richer understanding of public opinion.  
Semantic polling considered 
While useful, media analysis can only take us so far in terms of understanding semantic 
polling. Our interview data sheds more light on this emerging technique. In particular, the 
analysis of the semi-structured interviews with social media analysts, traditional pollsters, 
journalists, political campaign managers and election regulators revealed three interesting 
findings: the differing techniques being employed by those under-taking semantic analysis of 
social media data; the relationship between the traditional news media and social media 
analysis of public opinion; and the very different conceptions of public opinion that existed 
within our sample of interviewees. 
Methods of semantic polling 
Reflective of the embryonic form of these data gathering and measurement techniques, the 
firms undertaking semantic polling used a wide variety of methods to produce their data. At 
the simplest end of the spectrum, some firms employed simple keyword based techniques, 
where tweets were searched for appearances of certain words that were predefined as 
indicating positive or negative sentiment. This approach has obvious limitations, which will 
be unsurprising to any social scientists familiar with longstanding criticisms of content 
analysis methods (Krippendorff, 2013: 11-17). The inability to analyse context is particularly 
striking. As such, keyword based techniques have been abandoned by many of the firms 
following early experiments (social media practitioner 3).  
As a result, some of our interviewees had developed proprietary software capable of 
undertaking natural language processing. Here, a computer essentially “reads” the content of 
the text and attributes a sentiment value to it (Kao & Poteet, 2007). Since the computer is not 
simply counting words or looking for key terms, and instead looking at the totality of the 
meaning of a piece of text, the context of a statement is far easier to take into account (social 
media practitioner 1; social media practitioner 2; social media practitioner 3). Furthermore, 
by allowing human beings to correct the machine’s understanding of specific portions of text, 
the program’s accuracy can be increased over time and, with it, the reliability of its analysis.   
The issue of machine learning leads to another important methodological division that existed 
between the various semantic pollsters: the role for humans in the coding process. It should 
be noted that some rejected the idea outright, with one interviewee arguing that one of the 
virtues of this method of analysis is that it can be wholly automated and, thus, escape the 
possibility of human biases influencing results (social media practitioner 5). However, many 
interviewees acknowledged that they engaged in significant amounts of data cleaning using 
human coders. This reliance on human coders was said to occur because of the relatively high 
failure rate of machine coding. In particular, one problem that interviewees mentioned was 
coding for sarcastic or ironic comments. This was seen as an intrinsic problem with computer 
coding methods (social media practitioner 3). 
One firm in our sample was attempting to reconcile some of these ideas, experimenting with 
mixed data streams. This entailed a mix of three methods: Identifying highly influential 
Twitter users, not by number of followers but by seeing whose content and links were shared, 
what they termed a “depth metric”; second, identifying whether any social media user or 
news media outlet’s ‘angle’ or agenda diffused; and third, correlating candidate mentions on 
Twitter with their poll ratings. By bringing together the analysis of conversations and voting 
behaviour, it was argued, “you can see a strong correlation between how parties are 
performing and the issues people care about” (social media practitioner 1). 
These variations in semantic polling techniques are indicative of a methodology that is 
developing very rapidly. However, this also leads to some important questions. Media 
coverage of the election rarely pointed out the differences in methodologies that were being 
employed by different firms. Indeed, the proprietary nature of the tools meant that this 
information was rarely in the public domain. Key information, such as the accuracy of natural 
language processing techniques when compared to human coders, was never published with 
the results. As some scholars have pointed out, the results produced by semantic pollsters 
were in effect the products of black box processes, with neither journalists nor the public 
being given enough information to make informed judgments as to their validity (Chadwick, 
2011). 
Semantic polling and the traditional media 
An additional explanation for the reticence of semantic pollsters when discussing their 
methodologies, and in particular in releasing data on the inaccuracy of their techniques, may 
be found in their motivations for researching the election in the first place. A number of our 
interviewees admitted that they saw the election as a chance to get free media coverage for 
their companies and thus to raise their profile. Indeed, some went as far as to suggest that 
their definition of success was not making a correct prediction or a ‘provable statement’ 
about public opinion, but instead getting media coverage (social media analyst 5). Clearly, if 
the aim of the exercise is self-publicity of this kind, the last thing a firm will want to do is to 
draw attention to the weaknesses of its methodology.  
This was not a one-way relationship, however. Journalists also have their own motivations 
for covering stories using social media as evidence for public opinion. It has been argued that 
media demand for social media analysis of the public has driven much of the research in the 
field (Panagiotis Takis Metaxas, Eni Mustafaraj, & Daniel Gayo-Avello, 2011: 2). Our 
interviews demonstrated that major media organisations were actually commissioning social 
media research to augment their election coverage (journalist 1; journalist 2). This should not 
surprise us, as there is a strong pre-existing tendency towards increased reporting of the 
opinions of the public. The most obvious evidence of this is the increased number of polls 
carried out in recent elections, a pattern evident in a number of countries (Brettschneider, 
1997; Kellner, Twyman, & Wells, 2011; Traugott, 2005). Partially this development has been 
driven by public demand for increased data about the standings of candidates and parties 
(Iyengar, Norpoth, & Hahn, 2004). Additionally these developments may also be attributable 
to evolving patterns of news production. The near insatiable demand for content created by 
24 hour rolling broadcast news and the development of the internet, coupled with declining 
journalist resources in the newsroom, have increased the centrality of polls in media coverage 
(Dunaway, 2011; Frankovic, 2012; Rosenstiel, 2005). In such a climate, it is hardly surprising 
that news organizations in the UK have taken the opportunity afforded by social media 
monitoring to create new measures of public opinion. 
The construction of electoral narratives creates an additional connection between semantic 
polling and traditional media. An example of this can be seen in the phenomena of 
“Cleggmania”, the sudden surge in both opinion poll and social media-based support for Nick 
Clegg in the aftermath of the first televised debate. As one of our interviewees noted, the fact 
that datasets from social media reinforced the impression that this development was occurring 
made it far more newsworthy than it otherwise would have been (pollster 4). The seeming 
success of Clegg among Twitter users was put down to an echo chamber effect, especially 
given what was argued to be the bias towards political elites and the liberal-left on Twitter in 
the UK (pollster 4; journalist 1). Additionally, as one of the journalists we interviewed noted, 
explaining the results of semantic polling is a highly subjective process (journalist 2). This 
makes it much more likely to be framed in the context of existing and dominant narratives. 
The tendency towards dominant narratives should be no surprise, as it has been widely 
documented in academic studies of coverage of opinion polls, and in particular the narrow 
focus on the “horse race” (Larson, 2003; Patterson, 1993; Strömbäck, 2009). In the UK in 
2010, it seems this pattern continued, with data from social media being integrated with 
traditional polling numbers to fuel the Cleggmania narrative. As one pollster we interviewed 
conceded, his firm’s predictions began to be based more on the “Lib-Dem surge” media 
narrative than on their own research and that “we all got carried away with the story… we all 
bought in to some of that media mayhem” (pollster 2). 
Differing conceptions of public opinion  
Broadly, the traditional opinion pollsters in the sample offered three reactions to the 
possibilities offered by semantic polling: ignorance, curiosity or scepticism. Some pollsters 
were simply not aware of the presence of social media in political coverage, noting that it 
would be useful if millions of tweets could be analysed, clearly unaware that this is already 
occurring (pollster 4). Some pollsters did offer positive comments on the potential of social 
media analysis, noting that it could offer very rapid insights into public opinion or serve 
specific functions, such as message testing (pollster 3; pollster 5). Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
however, most had a dim view of the potential of semantic polling. One very obvious 
explanation for this is that semantic polling might pose a threat to pollsters’ livelihoods. 
Certainly, the nature of public opinion research is being challenged by technological 
developments. In 2009, a study done by the American Association of Public Opinion 
Research found that online research was now worth $2 billion a year. Furthermore, they 
estimated that 85 per cent of that revenue had been diverted from more traditional methods 
(AAPOR, 2009).  
Beyond explanations based on self-interest, however, our interviews also demonstrated major 
epistemological differences between traditional pollsters and social media researchers. 
Traditional pollsters (including some senior figures in the self-regulatory body the British 
Polling Council) criticised semantic polling because it was incapable of generating a 
representative sample of the voting population (pollster 2; pollster 5; regulator 2; regulator 3). 
This was particularly reflected in a concern on the part of many of the interviewees about the 
demographics of the Twitter-using population as compared to the wider electorate. As one 
pollster argued “It doesn’t help to talk to a million people if that million people are all in the 
same age group or the same gender, or they live in the same place or have the same political 
allegiance” (pollster 2).  
Data contamination was an additional concern with pollsters fearing that party activists could 
organise online or even employ “spambots” to give a false impression of public support 
(pollster 2). Traditional pollsters ask a range of questions during an election campaign, 
examining the public’s view on key issues and the popularity of would-be leaders. However, 
as some interviewees noted (pollster 1; pollster 5), the ultimate measure of success for a 
pollster during an election campaign is predicting the outcome. This emphasis on prediction 
also goes a long way towards explaining criticisms of social media research as non-
representative and reliant on data of dubious quality. 
Advocates of social media analysis in the interview sample responded to these claims by 
seeking to change the terms of the debate. One interviewee overtly responded to comments 
about the unrepresentativeness of semantic polling by arguing that “It’s not about 
representativeness, but it’s about individuals, news organisations and their articles, and the 
impact they have” (social media analyst 1). Another likened their research techniques to 
qualitative methods, noting that it amounted to the “the biggest possible focus group” (social 
media analyst 6). This was said to be because the data allow for the study of interactions, not 
just discrete individual opinions that are aggregated. 
Social media analysts argued that their techniques had certain strengths not found in other 
research methods. First, the data are generated without their intervention, limiting any 
possible distortion created by researcher intrusion (social media analyst 1; social media 
analyst 2). The reason this has such value, it was argued, was that there is a difference 
between “what people say when you ask them a direct question and what they choose to say 
about themselves when no one is really paying attention” (social media analyst 5). As such, 
semantic polling was argued to yield insights about how people talk about politics and 
respond to events that are not available through traditional research methods. Second, 
semantic polling was argued to have the potential to offer a more dynamic view of public 
opinion. In part, this was due to the immediacy of the data that could be gathered, seemingly 
offering real-time responses to political events (social media analyst 4; pollster 5). It was 
argued this is especially useful in the emerging hyper-mediated political environment, 
wherein stories can break very rapidly and certainly more quickly than traditional opinion 
polls can be put in the field (pollster 5). Third, it was noted the insights into public opinion 
arising from semantic polling were inherently social in orientation, offering the opportunity 
to better understand how opinions develop through interactions and group dynamics over a 
prolonged period of time (pollster 5; social media analyst 5; journalist 1). Finally, on a 
number of occasions, interviewees noted the potential of social media to lead to greater 
engagement, especially on the part of young people who are least likely to partake in the 
political process (social media analyst 4). Here we find an interesting reversal of an argument 
previously made regarding the unrepresentativeness of Twitter-users by traditional pollsters. 
Far from being seen as a weakness, it is reported here as a corrective, since it allows a new 
way for previously unheard voices to enter into the political process. 
Discussion: public opinion theory and semantic polling 
Our interviews suggest a fundamental disagreement between traditional and semantic 
pollsters about the value of their own research methods for understanding public opinion. 
While those engaged in social media research highlighted distinctive virtues of their methods 
(especially non-interventionism, rapidity and being able to model conversations), many of the 
opinion pollsters we interviewed focused on the social media sample being non-
representative, suggesting that semantic polling could best be characterised as an open access 
straw poll, a high-tech (but equally flawed) version of the Literary Digest poll (Lusinchi, 
2012). The two positions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, in order to see if 
and how they can be reconciled, it is important to reconsider contemporary definitions of 
public opinion.  
The need to develop an appropriate theoretical language to talk about semantic polling and 
public opinion is even more urgent now that the media is – as we document above – starting 
to report social media analysis. Practitioners, reporters and citizens require the conceptual 
terminology to understand and explain the data being reported. A large body of research has 
suggested that journalists around the world lack either the inclination or the technical 
knowledge to explain methodological nuance. In the case of traditional polling, this is most 
evident in the omission of statistical information, such as margins of error (see for example: 
Ferguson & De Clercy, 2005; Larson, 2003; Meyer, 1968; Patterson, 2005; Pétry & Bastien, 
2009; Smith & Verrall, 1985; Welch, 2002). Even when discussing qualitative public opinion 
methods, such as focus groups, reporters inappropriately tend to default to the language of 
quantitative opinion polling (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2000). The arguments made by 
traditional pollsters in our interviews make it clear that it would be equally inappropriate to 
talk of semantic polling in these terms. However, such an approach remains very likely in the 
absence of a revised definition of public opinion.     
Revisiting some older concepts of public opinion 
While our interviews with opinion pollsters reflect the dominance of traditional public 
opinion paradigm, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that the emergence of semantic 
polling heralds, in its very embryonic stages, the cusp of a new public opinion infrastructure. 
As such, we suggest that revisiting some older understandings of public opinion has the 
potential not only to offer a fresh perspective on how we can better understand semantic 
polling, but also better assess the strengths and weaknesses of this new set of methods. 
James Bryce and the organs of public opinion 
An instructive thinker in this regard is the nineteenth century British political theorist James 
Bryce. Although often cited by George Gallup as the inspiration behind his polling methods, 
Bryce has more recently been dismissed as outmoded and irrelevant to modern public opinion 
research (Bogart, 1985: 14). This is because Bryce’s definition of public opinion was broader 
than contemporary understandings, with the public voice being expressed through what he 
termed “organs of public opinion” (Bryce, 1888: chapter 92). By “organ” Bryce meant an 
arena where public opinion would become manifest. In his writing, Bryce identified four such 
organs: the press, public meetings, elections and citizen associations. Employing this 
approach, we might therefore think of social media as a new organ of public opinion.  
Bryce’s understanding of public opinion is significant for three reasons. First, the very nature 
of his idea of the organs of public opinion allows for multiple arenas where public opinion 
can become visible. In a contemporary setting, this allows opinion polling and semantic 
polling to co-exist as distinct manifestations of public opinion. Second, with the exception of 
the election itself, the environments that Bryce cites are not places where the whole electorate 
are represented. The technique of creating a statistically representative sample had not yet 
been devised at the time he was writing. However, it is also important to note that at least two 
of the organs of public opinion – public meetings and citizen associations – are analogous to 
social media, in that individuals enter into them and choose to participate if they feel inclined 
to do so, rather than being selected as part of a constructed sample. The assumption among 
the pollsters we interviewed that social media users were disproportionately likely to be 
politically interested, middle class and liberal-leaning reflects a similar critique. That said, 
there is also distinctive value in the town hall or social media-based organ of public opinion, 
as it allows for a more conversational definition of public opinion, something that opinion 
polling methods have been critiqued for neglecting (Larson, 1999). As a result, emotions, 
such as enthusiasm or anger, might be far more evident in a public meeting or on social 
media than they would appear in an opinion poll. Furthermore, while discussions online may 
only involve an unrepresentative and engaged subset of the population, public opinion theory 
would suggest that the opinions held and debates conducted by these smaller groups often 
pre-empt those that develop in wider society (Zaller, 1992: chapter 12). 
The third point refers to the contemporary concern (evident in our interview sample, 
especially with the traditional pollsters) that social media might be “hijacked” by organised 
political parties or pressure groups. However, Bryce’s idea of public opinion is inherently 
group-based and pluralist. The public, as it manifests itself within the organs of public 
opinion, reflects not only the opinions held by individuals but also the mobilisation potential 
of organisations, be they political parties, trade unions and pressure groups. Again we can 
apply this view to semantic polling. Instead of seeing such organisational capacity as a 
distortion – as the traditional pollsters do – a Bryce-inspired model of public opinion would 
instead interpret them as contours of the political landscape, and worthy of understanding. As 
such, if the Labour Party is able to mobilise its supporters to post #welovetheNHS, that is not 
a manipulation, but a political phenomenon of note.  
Herbert Blumer’s challenge to opinion polling orthodoxy 
A second theorist of public opinion whose work could contribute to developing a conceptual 
framework to understand the strengths and weaknesses of semantic polling is the American 
sociologist Herbert Blumer.
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 Writing at the same time as the emergence of modern opinion 
polling techniques, Blumer offered a very distinctive definition of public opinion which was 
critical of the then emerging orthodoxy. In particular, Blumer makes three claims that seem 
very appropriate for our assessment of the implications of semantic polling: the public is 
social, public opinion is hierarchical, and true public opinion requires that the public is 
engaged in political debates. 
Blumer’s first argument rejects the methodological individualism of opinion polling 
techniques, an orthodoxy that was expressed in the very early days of polling, based on the 
claim that public opinion is nothing more than the sum of individual opinions (Allport, 1937). 
Allport’s position reflected the values of his time, and in particular assumed primacy of one-
person-one-vote electoral systems. However, Blumer rejected this position as a simplification 
of public opinion, neglecting its social dimension – that is, the extent to which individual 
opinions are generated through social interaction over time rather than in isolation (Blumer, 
1948: 542-543). This argument has resonance when we consider measuring public opinion 
through social media, a set of techniques that can be used to evaluate the interactions between 
many people.  
This is related to Blumer’s second claim that public opinion measurement should be 
hierarchical. While opinion pollsters treat individuals within their sample as having equal 
status and their opinions as of equal import, Blumer argued that this was not how society 
worked. In his view, who held an opinion does matter, as some voices are likely to have more 
influence on public debate than others. Yet opinion polling gives no sense of whether a 
particular view was held by (in his example) “an archbishop or an itinerant laborer” (Blumer, 
1951: 546). Blumer’s position was that pollsters were only asking half the question. As well 
as knowing what people thought, analysts also needed to know the consequences of what a 
particular person thinks. Position in the social hierarchy and the power to influence debate 
become important factors. This idea clearly bears a similarity to contemporary social media 
analysts who are striving to measure influence online.      
Blumer’s third point relates to the engagement of the public and encompasses perhaps his 
most radical critique of opinion polling orthodoxy. Blumer argued that citizens’ involvement 
in politics can be divided into three distinct levels depending on the type of engagement 
occurring: the crowd, the public and the mass (Blumer, 1951). In the first instance, citizens 
engage through the crowd. The crowd is a unified entity sharing the same opinion on a topic 
and driven by emotion (indeed, Blumer’s idea of the crowd is analogous to coverage during 
the UK 2010 election that cited hashtags as representing a particular feeling among the 
public). The mass refers to the definition of citizen engagement most closely parallel to that 
measured by opinion polling. People within the mass might be aware of important issues, but 
the nature of the opinion poll (where their opinion is solicited by a researcher in private) 
means that they consider them in isolation from other citizens and do not have a chance to 
engage in debate that would allow them to deliberate and have their opinions challenged. In 
short, there is no social dimension to the technique of reporting their political opinions. 
Blumer’s definition of the public, in contrast, requires political engagement among a group of 
people who do not agree with each other, but are willing to debate and listen. There is much 
research to suggest that social media is a far from perfect environment for deliberation and 
high-quality political engagement (Hindman, 2008; Keen, 2007; Sunstein, 2009). However, 
what was occurring on Twitter during the general election arguably resembles Blumer’s 
definition of the public more than his definition of the mass. As such, this conception offers a 
very different way of understanding public opinion – inherently social and conversational. 
Semantic polling has the potential to provide research techniques for measuring public 
opinion with the public being conceptualised in this way, as distinct from the definition 
employed by traditional pollsters. 
Conclusion: the future of social media research and public opinion  
Coverage of the 2010 United Kingdom election suggests that the use of social media as a tool 
to understand and illustrate public opinion is starting to enter into mainstream media 
discourse. While this occurred in a variety of ways, including electronic vox pops and 
commentary on trending topics, more complex semantic polling techniques are also starting 
to be developed and employed in election coverage. These techniques and the corporate 
sector that uses them are evolving very rapidly, so it seems likely they will gather more 
interest in the future. 
What does this mean for the idea of public opinion? It is possible to measure the value of 
these techniques in two ways. First, their methodological effectiveness can be assessed 
against the existing paradigm of public opinion research, dominated by the representative 
sample opinion poll. Here, they are almost invariably found wanting. This might not always 
be the case. It is possible that future social media-based research methods will overcome this 
difficulty, developing weighting techniques that allow for the creation of a representative 
sample, in a manner similar to online panel surveys (for an exploratory attempt at employing 
this technique, see Sang & Bos, 2012).  
While not rejecting the potential value in such innovations, this article has suggested a 
different approach, arguing that semantic polling, even as currently practiced, has a number 
of distinctive virtues. In particular, it allows public opinion to be conceptualised as being 
more than the sum of discrete preferences and instead as an on-going product of 
conversation, embedded in the social relationships that create it.  
How would we conceptualise public opinion in an era of semantic polling? First, the issue of 
redefining public opinion goes beyond the methods available to study it. As with the 
representative sample opinion poll before it, semantic polling is the product of the society it 
exists in. The Gallupian paradigm was shaped by the ideas of the mass society of the 
twentieth century. Thus, the method employed aimed to discover the will of the total 
population, and communicate its relatively-settled preferences to the governing class. In 
contrast, social media research cannot claim the same level of representativeness. However, 
broad coverage of much of the population and ability to gather hour-by-hour or even minute-
by-minute data is arguably well suited to the more restless and atomized society found in late 
modernity. As such, we might be able to think less about public opinion and more about the 
opinions of various publics, as well as how they intersect and collide. 
This argument can be developed further if we consider the relationship between the different 
spaces in which public opinion becomes manifest and how these manifestations are 
understood. Traditional polling offer quantitative representations of what individuals 
cumulatively think, most often at the national level. In contrast, semantic polling can be used 
to measure and understand different organs in real time: the audience for a televised event, 
protesters at a demonstration, or delegates at a political conference.  Furthermore, semantic 
polling has the potential to offer qualitative and quantitative combinations that can be read 
through the traditional polling prism (noting the issue of non-representativeness) or used to 
evaluate how influence operates in political debates and offer a range of visualisations and 
representations. Different organs have distinctive purposes, whether it be predicting an 
election winner, explaining how public opinion shifts, broadcasting striking images of public 
back to themselves, and so on. It is through the totality of these organs that an imaginary of 
the nature of public opinion is created in a society as well as the empirical measurement of an 
actual public opinion existing at that moment.  Members of that public are aware of, and 
reflect on, both those imagined and measured publics to varying extents and interpret and talk 
about these forms of public opinion in their everyday lives. This assemblage evolves as new 
technologies and techniques emerge and as political leaders and publics develop their own 
conceptions of public opinion as political events develop over years and decades. This means 
that public opinion must thus be understood through both realist and constructivist lenses 
because of the reflexivity built into this infrastructure; the pressing research challenge is to 
understand how empirical publics are reflected on as citizens imagine public opinion and 
how those doing the measuring develop techniques framed by their own imaginaries of the 
nature of public opinion. This article has begun to open up these recursive loops by 
presenting some of the reflection going on by pollsters and journalists as they wrestle with 
new technologies and techniques.  
Adopting a new understanding of this kind is not an unprecedented challenge: the history of 
public opinion research is based on a dialectic interaction between evolving theories and 
methods. From this perspective then, the development of semantic polling is a disruptive 
event, challenging us to engage in theoretical discussion and revision. The great task for 
public opinion researchers of all types as well the journalists who cover politics is to find 
ways of explaining their datasets to the audience in a way that is intelligible and nuanced, 
reflecting both the strengths and weaknesses of the techniques being employed. This is 
difficult for a number of reasons, not least because many of the social media-based methods 
being deployed are incredibly complex or are the product of proprietary techniques. As 
research on coverage of opinion polling indicates, the media does not have the greatest track 
record on covering this kind of detail. However, the reward is potentially very great: a richer, 
more complete understanding of public opinion. 
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Table One: Uses of social media in 2010 election coverage and conceptions of the public 
 
Social media data use 
 
Historic parallel 
 
Conception of the public 
 
Quotation of individual status 
update 
 
Vox pop interview 
 
Individual as representative of 
strand in public opinion, 
“person on the street” 
 
Raw quantitative data (quoting 
number of social media updates 
during events; trending topics 
on social media) 
 
Accounts of election turnout; 
mobilisation in favour of cause, 
position 
Unified reaction among public 
or subset of public, linked to 
specific emotional disposition 
(apathy, engagement, anger etc) 
Semantic polling Straw poll; opinion poll Seeks to quantify a divided 
public 
 
  
Appendix One: Anonymous list of interviewees  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i
 [Anonymised project] also gave [Author 2] the chance to study other case studies such as the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake and 2009 UK swine flu vaccine campaign, and was designed to understand how citizens use social 
media to communicate in unfolding events. [Author 2] gained first-hand experience of designing, constructing 
and conducting social media analysis and disseminating the results to national news media immediately after 
events. 
ii
 These data was gathered by searching for articles that referenced both “Twitter” and “election” and were 
published during the statutory election campaign period (6
th
 April 2010 – 6
th
 May 2010). Nexis allowed us to 
search the following British national newspapers (number of articles gathered in parenthesis): The Guardian 
(49); The Daily Star (7); The Morning Star (2); The Daily Mail (15); The Independent (22); The Mirror (10); The 
Sun (11); The Times (20); The Daily Telegraph (37); The Express (10); Independent on Sunday (4); The Mail on 
Sunday (2); The Observer (15); The Sunday Times (12); The Sunday Telegraph (6); Sunday Mirror (1); The 
Sunday Express (4).    
iii
 We would like to thank our two research assistants, [Anonymous RA1] and [Anonymous RA2] for conducting 
and transcribing the interviews, and also the [Anonymous University 1] for providing the financial support for 
this research. 
iv
 In the interests of transparency, we would be happy to share anonymised interview transcripts with 
interested researchers. Please contact the authors directly for access.  
v
 Broken down, this subset of the data comprises of: 3 sections on the BBC Newsnight programme; 9 blog 
entries published on television channel websites (BBC and Channel 4); 25 print media stories; and 10 
additional sources including press releases from social analysis firms and articles in specialist publications such 
as Adweek. 
vi
 Rowlett actually misspoke here. The numbers cited are based on data gathered by the political social media 
monitoring firm Tweetminster, who actually claimed 154,000 debate related tweets published during the third 
debate. 
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vii
 See also Cellan-Jones 2010a; Greenslade 2010; Sullivan 2010; Ward 2010. For post-election academic 
analysis of this event, see Chadwick 2011a; Parry and Richardson 2011. 
viii
 Although, it should be noted that some solicitation of opinions from the public does occur. Many television 
programmes now encourage viewers to share their views about the broadcast by publicising a hashtag, for 
example.   
ix
 It should be noted that we are not the first to attempt to use Blumer’s work to understand social media and 
public opinion. Susan Herbst (2011) argued he would have likely approved of blogs as a mechanism for better 
understanding the public.  
